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# National Intelligence Bulletin

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
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


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### JAPAN

According to press reports, the Foreign Ministry is preparing a letter to be sent by Prime Minister Miki to President Ford asking for full US cooperation in clearing up the Lockheed bribery affair.

A resolution passed by both houses of the Diet yesterday urged full US cooperation and called on the Japanese government to send a special envoy to the US to pursue the matter. Miki is considering sending a representative, perhaps next week, and the press speculates that it will be Foreign Minister Miyazawa. The resolution is one of several concessions to opposition parties made by the ruling conservative party in an effort to resume normal Diet business, particularly passage of the budget.

Although most ruling party members would prefer not to pursue the investigation to the point of revealing the names of those Japanese officials allegedly involved, Prime Minister Miki personally may not be averse to full disclosure. He presumably was not involved in the payoffs, and may believe that some of his rivals in the party could be directly implicated. As party president and Prime Minister, he must in any event help dispel public suspicion that a coverup is under way.

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\* \* \* \*

The Lockheed affair has forced Tokyo to review plans for acquiring a new anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. The choice of a new ASW aircraft has been a major issue facing Japanese defense planners since the late 1960s.

Until the scandal broke earlier this month, Tokyo was well on the way to announcing sometime later this year its official choice of the Lockheed P3C aircraft and hoped to begin deployment in 1978. The scandal has encouraged domestic arms industry to lobby hard again for domestic development despite the government's preference for the superior US aircraft. Even before the scandal, the Japanese were exploring the possibility of domestic production, but such a decision now would not allow them to meet the 1978 deadline and would also be much more expensive. Indeed, Japanese plans for developing a patrol aircraft similar to the P3C reportedly have been pushed back another year for lack of sufficient funding.

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Although Tokyo has been careful to avoid any implication that the P3C deal has been killed outright, it probably will be some time before the government announces its final decision. Given the problems surrounding domestic production, Tokyo may again pursue the P3C, but probably through a government-to-government arrangement rather than through direct dealings with Lockheed.

Anti-submarine warfare is the major focus of Japanese naval operations, and any appreciable delay in acquiring the next generation of ASW aircraft could seriously set back Japan's military modernization program. It could also complicate any plans to expand Tokyo's role in protecting key sea lanes in the northern and western Pacific.

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### TURKEY

The Demirel government, already having trouble enough dealing with continuing student disorders, may soon be faced with widespread urban terrorism.

Turkish National Police officials have told US embassy officers that the Turkish Peoples' Liberation Army—an underground Marxist-Leninist group last active in the early 1970s—has plans for an extensive terrorist campaign directed primarily against Turkish security forces, but that US diplomatic and military personnel and their dependents would also be targets.

Interrogations of recently arrested Liberation Army members have led the police to conclude that the campaign will include bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings carried out primarily in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana.

The campaign may in fact already be under way:

--Suspected Liberation Army members have attacked police stations in Ankara and Istanbul and killed seven policemen.

--An Ankara university student was seriously injured late last week by an explosive device he was assembling.

--A US facility in Ankara for transient military personnel was bombed in late January.

--At about the same time, three suspected Liberation Army members were killed by police in eastern Turkey following the murder of two policemen.

Security officials believe that they are confronted by a serious threat and reportedly have placed all their personnel on alert. Suspected terrorist hangouts in Ankara and Istanbul have been raided by police. They have urged US officials to take all precautions, including repainting official vehicles and encouraging US military personnel to wear civilian clothing.

Turkey has experienced nearly continuous campus disorders between left and right wing student groups since last fall. The problem has been a manageable one for the weak Demirel government, in part because it has so far not been accompanied by an outbreak of urban terrorism. A combination of the two problems in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the main factor in forcing military intervention. A massive guerrilla campaign could rapidly overburden civilian security resources and lead to the imposition of martial law.

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### RHODESIA

Prime Minister Smith's announcement in the Rhodesian parliament that he is considering a British "communication" on the Rhodesian settlement talks appears to be part of delaying tactics designed to head off a resumption of full-scale guerrilla warfare against his regime. Smith implied that London had offered to play a part in the talks.

British Foreign Secretary Callaghan has issued a statement saying that his communication was limited to an inquiry as to the accuracy of several indirect "messages" that Smith wished the British to become involved in the talks. Callaghan asserted that Britain could become involved only if Smith was ready to be flexible in meeting Rhodesian black nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo's proposals.

Smith, in his parliamentary speech, said that the communist intervention in Angola had made a Rhodesian settlement more urgent and that a "change in tactics" could now be beneficial. He gave no indication, however, of any change in his opposition to early majority rule, asserting that he had already indicated what kind of settlement his government is seeking.

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Smith and Nkomo have reached an impasse over the key issue of broadening the franchise to include more blacks. Smith has rejected all of Nkomo's proposals designed to bring about eventual black majority rule. Neither side wants to break off the talks, however, and the Smith regime has announced that the next session will be held on Thursday.


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### ETHIOPIA

The arrests over the past ten days of at least 350 alleged opponents of the military regime appear to represent at least a temporary increase in the influence of the radical members of the faction-ridden ruling council. Major Mengistu Hailemariam, with radical support, reportedly ordered the arrests without securing the approval of other council members.




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The council yesterday acted to improve the implementation of its socialist program by reshuffling the government. Fifty-five officials were appointed to various key posts, including four cabinet ministers, three provincial administrators, and six permanent secretaries.


The arrests probably also served to intimidate potential government opponents and to pre-empt a move by dissidents suspected of planning an actual coup.

The bid for power by Mengistu and his radical supporters seems likely to lead to still another round of maneuvering within the council and the military. The council in recent months has recognized it is losing support, and more moderate council members are probably reluctant to go along with a further turn to the left or to allow Mengistu to dominate the council. An increase in radical influence would alienate important military units outside Addis Ababa.

Mengistu's opponents may find it difficult to organize an effective challenge. They are dispersed throughout the military and lack recognized leaders.



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### BRAZIL

President Geisel has taken additional steps to bring recalcitrant security officials under control and to strengthen his authority over the army.



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Late last month Geisel dismissed the Second Army commander following the death of a prisoner under army custody in Sao Paulo. The new commander, a close associate of the President, has already instructed his subordinates to obtain his approval before making arrests.

These actions constitute a strong assertion by Geisel of his authority as commander-in-chief and a sharp rebuke to military conservatives—many of whom have disregarded his previous orders to curb such abuses as torture and illegal detentions.


The President's initiatives have not met with direct opposition, and are unlikely to do so, but there are indications that a whispering campaign has begun against liberals and alleged subversives who occupy prominent government positions.

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similar innuendo is being used to discredit Army Minister General Frota, long regarded as a spokesman for conservative military views, who may have incurred the wrath of hardliners for his failure or inability to stand up to Geisel. If forced into a more defensive posture, security officials might well support illegal death-squad operations against those whom they view as political threats to the regime.

In taking on the conservatives, Geisel is trying to roll back the influence of a sector of the military that has been a dominating influence on all presidents since 1964. If he succeeds, he will greatly enhance his personal authority and ease the way for further relaxation of political controls, a goal Geisel has professed but in the achievement of which he has largely been stymied. If he fails, his hands will be tied on even more issues for the balance of his term.

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
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### FOR THE RECORD

JAPAN: The Japan Communist Party (JCP) has decided not to send a delegation to the 25th Soviet party congress opening today. Agreement apparently was not reached at a recent meeting in Tokyo between JCP officials and Soviet party officials over JCP demands that Moscow drop its support for a Japanese Communist splinter group. Japan's Socialist Party, on the other hand, will send a representative to the Soviet congress.

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
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